

## Aspects of Conceptual Composing<sup>1</sup>

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*Dr. Annette Wigger in memoriam*

The title of this paper refers to the exhibition *Conceptual Art and Conceptual Aspects*, which was presented by the *New York Cultural Center* in 1970.<sup>2</sup> “Conceptual” here appears as an adjectival description for an art that no longer defines itself fundamentally through the medium of its physical manifestation, but instead takes place in the realm of ideas, in light of which the medium in which these ideas are communicated loses significance. “Idea Art”<sup>3</sup> designates the same concept, while the composite term “Konzeptkunst” soon caught on in the German language. “Conceptual Aspects” elevates what was initially an adjectival modifier to the status of subject: an aspect is first of all an aspect of something; “aspectare” denotes attentive regard or contemplation, which always necessitates a subject. The use of the word “conceptual” in “conceptual aspects” implies that above and beyond “conceptual art” (an art of ideas), there is the imagination itself, an elementary way of relating to the world through “imaginal regard”. The basic thesis of the following reflections is that there is as much opportunity for aesthetic experience on this level of “imaginal regard” as there is in dealings with physical artistic artifacts.

Aesthetic experience presupposes a relationship to the world. One would scarcely say that one had aesthetic experiences solely of or with oneself. Even authors who take a critical stance toward a pure aesthetics of reception concede that sensory perception of an object or event in the world precedes the aesthetic experience: “Das Kunstwerk [ist] als für den Sinn des Menschen dem Sinnlichen entnommen”<sup>4</sup> (Hegel).

Perception presupposes the spatial as well as temporal presence of the perceiver and the object of perception. It always occurs in time: I observe an object, walk around it, and get to know it from various perspectives. The perceptual object thus constituted does not suddenly reveal itself as a concept, such as I might have of a cube, rather it *arises* as a function of cognition. Sartre formulates in this context: “on doit apprendre les objets.”<sup>5</sup>

So, too, with the perception of an occurrence: I observe an event that takes place in the immediate present, and likewise constitute a perceptual object, which this time, however, is experienced not as something perceived in time, then disengaged from it, but as something whose temporal core inheres.

Common to both cases of perception is that their objects, with their abundance of attributes, always exceed one’s consciousness of them, and so perception is never complete: “C'est cette infinité de rapports qui constitue l'essence même d'une chose. De là quelque chose

de *débordant* dans le monde des 'choses': il y a, à chaque instant, toujours infiniment *plus* que nous ne pouvons voir; pour épuiser les richesses de ma perception actuelle, il faudrait un temps infini.”<sup>6</sup> (Sartre).

The image is thus different from the perception inasmuch as it is independent of the immediate presence, indeed even the existence or possibility, of what is imagined. Hume understood images and perceptions as contents of consciousness having different qualities: “Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name *impressions*. [...] By *ideas* I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning.”<sup>7</sup> As memory or product of the imagination, therefore, the image lacks intensity in comparison with the perception.

Sartre interprets this assessment as a consequence of the illusion of immanence, in which he sees Hume’s understanding of consciousness and the contents of consciousness trapped. Namely, if one views consciousness not as “as a place peopled by small imitations [the images]”<sup>8</sup> but as a structure that intends and indicates its objects in various ways (forms of consciousness), the assessment of consciousness and imagination as strong and weak perception no longer holds up. The perceiving consciousness slowly forms an eternally incomplete perceptual object, the imagining consciousness *posit*s the imaginal object: “L’objet de la perception déborde constamment la conscience; l’objet de l’image n’est jamais rien de plus que la conscience qu’on en a.”<sup>9</sup>

That we can have not only perceptions but also images in an aesthetic mode has been shown most recently by Martin Seel in *Ästhetik des Erscheinens* [*Aesthetics of Appearance*].<sup>10</sup> Even if one would not want to concur with Seel that an aesthetic experience necessarily calls for the special “appearance” of the aesthetic object, the concept of the aesthetic image as an “imagined manifestation” of the sensory encounter (perception)<sup>11</sup> nevertheless smoothes the way for an aesthetic experience beyond the immediate presence of the perceiver and the perceptual object. With this, it is possible to integrate objects and events (processes) that wholly or partially elude perception, due to their spatial extension, temporal duration or immateriality, into the art idiom.

An installation whose visual and/or acoustic elements go through constant random changes or non-repetitive permutations is an example of a perceptual object that cannot be perceived in its entirety, not just because of the structure of perception, but also due to the way it appears. In this case, every perception remains the perception of an excerpt that will not recur. (That art approaches natural beauty in this structure of essentially inexhaustible materiality is noted here in passing.<sup>12</sup>) But only when the installation is available to experience not just during public opening hours, but all its media can (potentially) be experienced continuously, does it establish a perceptual space whose presence matches the aesthetic imagination. Most long-term installations in public space achieve this, but so do some gallery works that, at the artist’s instruction, are not switched off when the gallery is closed.<sup>13</sup>

The aspect of the aesthetic imagination of real presence becomes especially vivid during long but time-limited events having the character of a performance (e.g. *calme étendue* by Wandelweiser composer Antoine Beuger, 1996/97, which lasts up to nine hours<sup>14</sup>). A piece of music of nine hours’ duration necessarily eludes perception as a whole. The knowledge of its actual performance at the moment is available to an audience member who is absent from the room solely as an aesthetic image. Here the uncertain element of truth in such a projective image is in antithetical tension to the phenomenological structure of perception and imagination. When I leave the room, I can assume at any given time that the performance is going on, and something is happening in the performance space that follows the score (with which I’m familiar) and/or is related or similar to what I perceived at an earlier moment

during the performance. This uncertainty nonetheless points to the uncertainty of any given *perception*, which can always deceive me. But my imagination cannot.<sup>15</sup> Imagining, as a synthetic act, is always certainty, for rather than telling me something about the world, it is solely the product of my assumptions.

(The contradiction may be aesthetically productive, but it is easily resolved: In imagining, consciousness posits an object that is not (necessarily) present or even existing; perception, on the other hand, posits an object that is necessarily present and able to be experienced through the senses. Projective imagination posits its object as present, but not at the moment, and not existing, and so implies a claim to truth other than that of simple imagination.)

The concept of aesthetic imagination also makes it possible to think about artifacts from different genres, performed at various times and places, as *one* work of art or music. An example of this is the long-term project *3 Jahre – 156 Musikalische Ereignisse – eine Skulptur* by Carlo Inderhees and Christoph Nicolaus,<sup>16</sup> in which the authors establish a temporal sequence that extends over three years. At one-week intervals, premieres of ten-minute solo pieces by various composers and interpreters took place in Berlin's Zionskirche, and the arrangement of a 96-piece floor sculpture in the same space was altered. Going beyond the hermeneutic circle, whereby the part can only be understood in the context of the whole, but the whole only as the sum of its parts, here the perceiver's imagination is necessary to integrate the temporally discontinuous, heterogeneous individual elements into a whole. The aesthetic experience is formed in the complex melding of actual perception and recollective and projective imagination. That which takes place during the listening comprehension of a piece of music, the constitution of form in the listener's cognition while it is disengaging from the current present moment, now occurs in relation to a work still more diversified in terms of its media and spatiotemporal structure.

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In the preceding reflections, I have compared sensory experience of the physical artifact, as was characteristic of aesthetic thought since Alexander Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* of 1750, with the aesthetic imagination. In the following, I would like to interrogate this figure of thought in the fields of conceptual music, conceptual art and performance art.

In his treatise *Musica*, Nicolaus Listenius in 1537 differentiated between the *musica practica* of the performance and the *musica poetica* of the composition: "Poetica quae neque rei cognitione, neque solo exercitio contenta, sed aliquid post labore renquit operis, veluti cum a quopiam Musica aut Musicum carmen conscribitur, cuius fines est opus consumatum et effectum. Consitit enim in faciendo sive fabricando, hoc est, in labore tali, qui post se etiam artifice mortuo opus perfectum et absolutum relinquat."<sup>17</sup> This enhanced the status of the work as musical text relative to the work as performance, and notation was no longer merely instructions for "setting music in motion", but a work in itself. It was a widely held idea among experts and aficionados around 1800 that music does not necessarily require performance.

However, this stance only makes sense in relation to *Tonkunst*, in which elements such as timbre, physical acoustic phenomena, or improvisation play no special role. The *opus perfectum et absolutum* is not solely a music aesthetical category, it also implies certain demands of the artifact under contemplation. Composing music and theoretical discourse about music are in a close reciprocal relationship.

The idea that a work does not exhaust itself in performance, that the performance of the work might even be dispensed with, was taken up in the 1960s by exponents of Fluxus and conceptual art. In 1964 Giuseppe Chiari explained that the actions in his piece *La Strada* “may be performed or [a] recording of the performance may be broadcast. Or they may be announced, leaving the spectator [sic] to imagine the auditive events they represent. The author prefers announcing nearly all the actions and performing or broadcasting only a few of them.”<sup>18</sup> Four years later, Lawrence Wiener, in a statement that since has become famous, described the basic suppositions of minimal and conceptual art: “1. The artist may construct the piece. 2. The piece may be fabricated. 3. The piece need not be built.”<sup>19</sup>

The distinction between the work and the realized object or event, and the differentiation between the author and the person who executes or performs the piece, seem self-evident and not very spectacular in the field of music. In the field of art, however, they portended a scandal. The artist’s practical manual skills suddenly lost significance and the unique character of the work was radically called into question. Instead, certificates were created with instructions for carrying out the work, such as the wall drawings of Sol LeWitt. It was no longer an artifact produced by an artist that was being dealt with, but rather the legitimatization, sometimes even the obligation, to realize a concept created by the artist.

The integration of elements of a musical performative aesthetic into the idiom of the visual arts was consummated during the American Happening movement of the 1950s. An important conduit for dissemination was the course in *Experimental Composition* that John Cage gave from 1956 to 1960 at the New School for Social Research in New York, which was attended by the Fluxus artists George Brecht, Al Hansen, Dick Higgins, Allan Kaprow and Jackson Mac Low, and others.<sup>20</sup>

From George Brecht’s notebooks one can see that Cage conveyed his thinking using the musical parameters of frequency (pitch), duration, amplitude (volume), overtone structure (timbre) and morphology. Each parameter describes a field of continuous values.<sup>21</sup> Not all the parameters of an event in a piece must be determined in detail – the various parameters may be designed in isolation from one another, a modus operandi wholly indebted to composition practice in serial music. Cage’s students were especially fond of pieces in which only the entrances, duration, or frequency of sounds were composed. In *Time-Table Music* by George Brecht,<sup>22</sup> the arrival and departure times in a train station are interpreted as entrance points in minutes and seconds. Each performer (their number and the instrumentation are not prescribed) prepares his/her own part, and performs it with the others in unexpected simultaneity. Precisely concurrent entrances of several different parts are possible.

Al Hansen derived the structure of *Alice Denham in 48 Seconds* from the position of the letters in the name of the then famous centerfold model.<sup>23</sup> Each letter corresponds with the number that denotes its position in the alphabet. The first numeral denotes the number of sounds, the second numeral the number of seconds in which the sounds are produced. In all, there are seven time frames in which certain numbers of sounds are to be played, divided into two movements. But the sum of these durations lasts 28 seconds, not 48, as the title might lead one to assume.

## ALICE DENHAM<sup>24</sup>

1, 12, 9, 3, 5; 4, 5, 14, 8, 1, 13


<u>number of sounds</u>	<u>number of seconds</u>
1	1
2	9
3	5
4	5
1	4
8	1
1	3

*Alice Denham in 48 Seconds* had its premiere in the Cage class, where it was done with acoustically interesting toys. The *Audio-Visual-Group*, which came out of the Cage classes, later gave performances that Al Hansen called *Music Happenings*.<sup>25</sup>

Two other entrance and duration pieces became famous in the Fluxus concerts of the 1960s, *Solo for Sick Man* and *In Memoriam to Adriano Olivetti* by George Maciunas, both from 1962. Maciunas did not study with Cage, but was quite familiar with his work through contact with the New York art scene. *Solo for Sick Man* lists 16 typical, usually noisy actions of a flu sufferer. Along with this list, there is a table in which seconds are to be filled in. Whether these signify duration or entrance times, and how these numbers are to be generated, remains open.<sup>26</sup> *In Memoriam to Adriano Olivetti* asks performers to use printed rolls of paper from Olivetti adding machines as parts, in such a way that each performer is assigned an action (with or without sound), which he/she performs when the assigned number is reached.<sup>27</sup> Here, though, a continuous pulse is established and simultaneously occurring actions in the timing are probable, since every performer uses another numerical sequence as a score.

These performance pieces by visual artists can be understood as playful tentative steps into the foreign métier of music. But they also testify to the artists' awareness of the performative aspect, which up to then had not been taken into account.

In the notebooks George Brecht filled during the Cage classes at the New School, there is a draft for an unpublished article about *Notation and Performance*.<sup>28</sup> After several discarded attempts, Brecht finally arrives at a description of the relationships between composer, notation, performer, sound and listener in the form of a multidimensional diagram, which surmounts the linear relational structure of earlier models.<sup>29</sup> The *Composer* fixes a composition in *Notation*. This is interpreted by a *Performer* and translated into *Sound* in the performance. It is possible to have performances without an interpreting performer, namely by playing prerecorded music. The *Listener* hears the sound, whereby he/she first constitutes the music in his or her musical experience. But the listener can also read the notation directly. In an earlier model, Brecht also took into account the ambient sounds that enter into the listener's experience. As he defined it in this context: "The composer-performer interaction gives rise to sound free to be experienced. The sound-listener interaction is music."<sup>30</sup>



George Brecht, *Notation and Performance*, sketch July 1959, from: *Notebook III*, p. 127

In this thinking about the aesthetics of reception in music, listeners and their perceptions and experience acquire decisive significance. Now “the listener as virtuoso” appears.<sup>31</sup> – “For the virtuoso listener all sounds may be music.”<sup>32</sup> In the multidimensional diagram, George Brecht applies the term music solely to the relationship between the listener and the acoustic event. Brecht seems to view other elements of conceptual thinking about music as not necessary to the understanding of music. One is tempted to interpret this stance in light of his *Project in Multiple Dimensions* (1957/58), in which Brecht conceives of his artistic conduct as activity in a multidimensional mediated and semantic space.<sup>33</sup> Music for him – in contrast to John Cage – is not an integrative concept, but the aesthetic reception of acoustic phenomena, only one dimension of a multidimensional artistic situation.

Even before his encounter with Cage, George Brecht had dealt with aspects of chance in art. As a trained chemist, he was familiar with mathematical statistics, and as an artist he, like Pollock, had experimented with the chance application of colors in painting. He crumpled up long lengths of fabric, painted the outer surface, and then observed the result when the fabric was unfolded.<sup>34</sup> So for Brecht, the aleatory openness of the performance pieces created in the Cage classes probably was not a new experience. Brecht’s involvement with music was guided much more by the visual artist’s interest in critically questioning his own working processes. So he moved from performance pieces on the one hand and objects on the other to their combination in the Event.

In 1959 George Brecht had a solo exhibition at the Reuben Gallery in New York titled *Toward Events*. He later explained this title, commenting that he had been increasingly unsatisfied with the emphasis on the acoustic aspects of a situation and that “The word ‘event’ seemed closer to describing the total, multi-sensory experience I was interested in than any

other.”<sup>35</sup> Among the objects in the exhibition was *The Case*, a picnic basket filled with various objects. The instructions for dealing with the object note: “*The Case* is found on a table. It is approached by one or several people and opened. The contents are removed and used in ways appropriate to their nature. The case is repacked and closed. The event (which lasts possibly 10–30 minutes) comprises all sensible occurrences between approach and abandonment of the case.”<sup>36</sup> The visual artist thus integrates his sculpture of the packed picnic basket into a performative situation in which visitors to the exhibit interact with the sculpture in ways prescribed by the artist’s score. The recipient becomes a participant.

In other Events, the relation between author, audience, score, object and situation dissolves still further. The *Chair Event* from 1962 describes a sculpture in the form of a verbal score, one which Brecht himself also had (repeatedly) performed:<sup>37</sup>

#### CHAIR EVENT

on a white chair

a grater  
tape measure  
alphabet  
flag

black

on spectral colors

Just as with a piece of music, however, the score can also be performed by someone else. Or one reads the score and leaves it to the imagination (as we do now).

And so we return to the phenomenon of the aesthetic imagination. In aesthetic experience, the object disappears behind the image one has of it. This image need not be developed from a physical artifact by the perceiver him/herself, but can be conveyed by other means.

The Zionskirche project by Inderhees/Nicolaus mentioned earlier is communicated by documentation drawn up by the artists. Here the text and the work that can be physically experienced are in an ambivalent relation to each other – for a composer this is not unusual. Unlike scores that serve as instructions for performance, this work-text was created after the conclusion of the project, which cannot be realized again. Members of the audience actualize the idea of the work in their imagination in the mood of the never-to-be-repeated past. The not-now and no-longer of the actualizing imagination become the never-again of the perpetually bygone realization.

Swiss composer Manfred Werder takes this unique character of the performed (not the performance), borrowed from art, to an extreme when he specifies that the extrapolations of his *Stück 1998 [Piece 1998]* may be played only one time. So not only is the performance unrepeatable, as with performance art that cannot be reproduced, but also that which is played. The listener hears this music knowing that the sound sequences heard will never be played again, and so finds him/herself in a state of heightened presence, thanks to the aesthetic idea of the work communicated qua language. A concept beyond the sound that cannot be experienced through the senses significantly shapes the aesthetic experience. It is

in this way that, through their reciprocal relationship with the audience, works of conceptual art and conceptual music overcome their self-contained objectification and become what they are in the movement between the perceiving and imagining consciousness.

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<sup>1</sup> The first part of this paper is based on reflections that I first set out in the essay *Wahrnehmung, Vorstellung und Erfahrung. Phänomenologische Überlegungen zur ästhetischen Vorstellung* in the program book of the Donaueschinger Musiktage 2003. An earlier version was presented at the concert series of contemporary music ensemble *incidental music* in Berlin, Germany in 2005. Translation from the German by AK Lerner.

<sup>2</sup> New York Cultural Center (ed.): *Conceptual Art and Conceptual Aspects*. New York 1970.

<sup>3</sup> cf.: Gregory Battcock, *Idea Art. A critical Anthology*. New York: Dutton, 1973.

<sup>4</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1992: vol. 1, p. 52. “The work of art, as being for apprehension by man’s senses, is drawn from the sensuous sphere.” Hegel: *Aesthetics. Lectures in Fine Art*. Trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 32.

<sup>5</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’Imaginaire. Psychologie-phénoménologique de l’imagination*. Paris: Gallimard, 1940, p. 18. “One must learn objects” Sartre, *The Imaginary. A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination*. Trans. Jonathan Webber. London, New York: Routledge, 2004, p.8.

<sup>6</sup> Sartre, *L’Imaginaire*, p. 20; emphasis in original – “It is this infinity of relations that constitutes the very essence of a thing. Hence, a kind of overflowing in the world of ‘things’: there is, at every moment, always infinitely more than we can see; to exhaust the richness of my current perception would take an infinite time.” Sartre, *The Imaginary*, p. 9.

<sup>7</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. London: John Noon, 1739 (Reprint Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), p.1.

<sup>8</sup> cf. Sartre, *L’Imaginaire*, p. 14 – “Nous nous figurions la conscience comme un lieu peuplé de petits simulacres.” –“We depicted consciousness as a place peopled with small imitations and these imitations were the images.” Sartre, *The Imaginary*, p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> Sartre, *L’Imaginaire*, pp. 20-21. “The object of perception constantly overflows consciousness; the object of an image is never anything more than the consciousness one has of it.” Sartre, *The Imaginary*, p.10.

<sup>10</sup> Martin Seel, *Ästhetik des Erscheinens*. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 2003: especially pp. 120-131.

<sup>11</sup> Martin Seel, *Ästhetik*, p. 131, and elsewhere: “Immer aber zeichnet sich das ästhetische Vorstellen durch eine imaginierte sinnliche *Gegenwärtigkeit* des Vorgestellten aus.” (op. cit., p. 125; emphasis in original) – “But the aesthetic imagination always is characterized by the imagined sensory *presence* of what is imagined.”

<sup>12</sup> It was Adorno who, rejecting Hegel, rehabilitated the concept of natural beauty in aesthetic discourse: “Kunst ahmt nicht Natur nach, auch nicht einzelnes Naturschönes, doch das Naturschöne an sich. Das nennt, über die Aporie des Naturschönen hinaus, die von Ästhetik insgesamt. Ihr Gegenstand bestimmt sich als unbestimmbar, negativ.” (Theodor. W. Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie*, eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973, p. 113.) – “Art does not imitate nature, not even individual instances of natural beauty, but beauty as such. This denominates not only the aporia of natural beauty, but the aporia of aesthetics as a whole. Its object is determined negatively, as indeterminable.” (Adorno: *Aesthetic Theory*. Trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor. London, New York: Continuum 2004, p. 94.)

<sup>13</sup> An example of this is the sound installation, signed as a “sound drawing”, *Möwe* [Seagull] by Akio Suzuki in the SFB Sound Gallery in February 2002. Cf. Volker Straebel, *Horizont und Himmel*, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Feb. 27, 2002, Berliner Seiten BS4.

<sup>14</sup> The individual parts are published by Edition Wandelweiser: Haan 1996, 1997.

<sup>15</sup> cf. Sartre, *L’Imaginaire*, p. 21. Sartre, *The Imaginary*, p.10.

<sup>16</sup> Documentation in Selbstverlag der Künstler, Berlin and Munich 2000, cf. also Volker Straebel, *3 Jahre – 156 Musikalische Ereignisse – eine Skulptur*, in: Dissonanz Nr. 62 (November 1999).

<sup>17</sup> Nicolaus Listenius, *Musica. Ab authore denuo recognita multisque novis regulis et exemplis aducta*. Norimbergae apud. Johan. Petreium anno 1549, ed. Georg Schüinemann. Berlin: Breslauer 1927: unpag. caput I. – “Poetic is that which is not content with just the understanding of the thing nor with only its practice, but which leaves something more after the labor of performance, as when music or a song of musicians is composed by someone whose goal is total performance and accomplishment. It consists of making or putting together more in this work which afterwards leaves the perfect and absolute.” Nicolaus Listenius, *Music*. Trans. Albert Seay. Colorado Springs (Colorado): Colorado College Music Press, 1975, p.3.

<sup>18</sup> Giuseppe Chiari, *La Strada*, in: *George Maciunas und Fluxus-Editionen*. Cologne: Galerie und Edition Hundertmark, 1992, one of 20 unnumbered cards.

<sup>19</sup> Lawrence Weiner, *[untitled statement]*, in: *January 5-31, 1969*. Exhibition catalogue Seth Siegelaub, New York 1969, unpag.

<sup>20</sup> cf. Bruce Altshuler: *The Cage Class*, in: *FluxAttitudes*, eds. Cornelia Lauf and Susan Hapgood. Gent: Imschoot Uitgeves, 1991, pp. 17–23.

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<sup>21</sup> “Dimensions of Sound: (1) Frequency – pitch hi-low [sic], (2) Duration – duration long-short, (3) Amplitude – volume, (4) overtone-structure – timbre, (5) morphology – attack - body – decay” (George Brecht, *Notebooks I-III* (1958/59), ed. Dieter Daniels [photomechanical reproduction of the handwriting]. Cologne: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walter König, 1991, vol. 1, p. 3).

<sup>22</sup> Dated summer 1959, published in George Brecht: *Water Yam* (book box in various editions).

<sup>23</sup> cf. Al Hansen: *A Primer of Happenings & Time/Space Art*. New York: Something Else Press, 1965: pp. 96-97 and Dick Higgins: *Postface [=Jefferson's Birthday]*. New York: Something Else Press, 1964, p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> This is a reconstruction of the score from descriptions of the piece by Hansen and Higgins.

<sup>25</sup> cf. Hansen, *Primer*, p. 97 and p. 102, also Thomas Dreher, *Performance Art nach 1945. Aktionstheater und Intermedia*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001, p. 29.

<sup>26</sup> Reprinted in: *In the Spirit of Fluxus*, ed. Janet Jenkins. Exhibition catalogue, Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, Minn. 1993, p. 158.

<sup>27</sup> Reprinted in: *The Fluxus Performance Workbook*, ed. Ken Friedman, special edition *El Djarida*, Trondheim 1990, p. 39.

<sup>28</sup> George Brecht: *Notebooks I-III*, vol. 3, pp. 111, 114–131.

<sup>29</sup> op. cit., p. 127.

<sup>30</sup> op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>31</sup> op. cit., p. 111.

<sup>32</sup> op. cit., p. 123.

<sup>33</sup> cf. George Brecht, *From “Project in Multiple Dimensions”*, in: Henry Martin, *An Introduction to George Brecht’s Book of the Tumbler on Fire*. Bologna: Multhipla Edizioni, 1978, pp. 126–127.

<sup>34</sup> cf. George Brecht and Irmeline Lebeer, *An Interview with George Brecht [1973]*, in: Henry Martin, *An Introduction*, pp. 83–89, here p. 83.

<sup>35</sup> George Brecht, *The Origin of Events* [1970], in: *Happening & Fluxus*, materials compiled by H. Sohm, catalogue Kölnischer Kunstverein, Cologne, 1970, unpag., in the artist alphabet in the second part of the book.

<sup>36</sup> George Brecht, *Toward Events*, in: *Happening & Fluxus*, unpag. chronology 1959.

<sup>37</sup> Undated, published in George Brecht: *Water Yam*; reprinted with pictures of two realizations in: Gabriele Knapstein, *George Brecht: Events*. Berlin: Wiens Verlag 1999, app., fig. 21.